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China’s merger control once applied only to circumstances where 
foreign companies sought to buy Chinese companies.1  However, since 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) 2 was enacted in August 2008, 
China has established a merger control regime that applies generally to 
both foreign and Chinese companies.  For example, even an offshore 
merger transaction that ostensibly has little connection to China is now 
subject to China’s merger control if the transaction meets certain turnover 
thresholds3 and other criteria specified in the AML.  The Ministry of 
Commerce of China (“MOFCOM”), which is primarily in charge of the 
AML’s merger control regime, has been very active in enforcing merger 
control over offshore transactions.4  China's merger review regime has 
rapidly become an important regulatory obstacle for both China-specific 
and global merger transactions.5  Additionally, the growing globalization 
and importance of China’s economy is forcing more and more 
multinational companies to take the merger control regime seriously.6  
The main objective of this article is to explore current practices and 
procedures of China’s merger control regime that have developed under the 
AML.  Part I provides a brief overview of the merger control regime under 
AML.  Part II discusses the transactions that trigger China’s merger control 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Waiguo Touzhizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding ( ) 
[Regulation on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] 
(promulgated and amended by MOFCOM, State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Commission of 
the State Council (“SASAC”), State Admin. of Taxation (“SAT”), SAIC, CSRC and State Admin. of 
Foreign Exch. (“SAFE”), Jun. 22, 2009, effective Jun. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/f/200907/20090706416939.html [hereinafter Foreign M & A 
Regulation]. 
2 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduan Fa ( ) [Anti-Monopoly Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2007-10/09/content_5374672.htm; translation at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471587.htm [hereinafter AML]. 
3 Turnover includes revenues derived from the sales of products or provision of services deducting 
relevant taxes and fees.  See infra Part II B. 
4 Peter Wang, et al., China Merger Review: A New Gauntlet for Global M&A, 15 M & A LAW, no. 8, 
2011 at 1.  
5 Id. 
6 See Adam W. Himmelberger, Tripartite Convergence for Certainty in Merger Review Under China's 
Anti-Monopoly Law, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL. L. REV. 289, 310 (2010).!
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regulations.  Part III outlines the pre-merger notification process under the 
AML.  Part IV analyzes the substantive assessment criteria under the AML 
and MOFCOM’s relevant practices.  Part V explores remedies that may be 
imposed by MOFCOM.  Finally, Part VI concludes that parties to a 
relevant merger transaction should be aware of the potential impact of 
China’s merger review regime and, accordingly, should plan their Chinese 
merger notifications carefully.  
 
I. History and Overview of China’s Merger Control Regime 
 
A. The Pre-AML Merger Control Regime in China 
 
Prior to the adoption of the AML, China had a merger review 
system in place under Foreign M & A Regulation, which came into force in 
2003.7  Before the implementation of the current AML, the Foreign M & A 
Regulation applied only to acquisitions of domestic enterprises by 
foreigners and international mergers.8  The Foreign M & A Regulation, as 
amended in 2006, contained two anti-concentration clauses that established 
a pre-merger review system in which relevant parties to a merger had to 
submit an explanatory report to MOFCOM and China’s State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce for approval if the merger meets 
certain statutory notification thresholds.9  After the AML came into effect, 
MOFCOM amended the Foreign M & A Regulation on June 22, 2009 and 
deleted the anti-concentration clauses due to inconsistencies between the 
merger control part of the Foreign M & A Regulation and the AML.10  
Since then, the AML has been China’s only statutory source of pre-merger 
review control, applying to all kinds of mergers and acquisitions, whether 
carried out by foreign or domestic enterprises.11 
 
B. Overview of Merger Control Regime under the AML 
 
The AML is generally consistent with competition laws of the 
European Union (“EU”) and the US.12  The AML basically follows the 
patterns of EU competition law, prohibiting cartel behavior, abuses of a 
dominant position, anti-competitive agreements, and anti-competitive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Foreign M & A Regulation, supra note 1. 
8 TAO JINGZHOU & OWEN NEE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:  BUSINESS LAWS OF CHINA § 12:4 (2011 
ed.). 
9 Id. 
10 H. Stephen Harris, Jr. et al., Antimonopoly Law, in KENNETH A. CUTSHAW ET. AL., CORPORATE 
COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, § 12:32 (3d ed. 2012). 
11 Id. 
12 See DAVID J. GERBER, Global Competition:  Law, Markets, and Globalization 234 (Oxford 2010). 
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mergers.13  Such business conduct is also regulated under US competition 
law.14  However, diverging from the American antitrust policy, the AML 
explicitly incorporates non-competition factors into its analysis, such as 
whether a transaction advances the healthy development of a socialist 
market economy.15 
Chapter 4 of the AML, “Concentration of Undertakings,” sets forth 
the Chinese merger control scheme.16  According to the AML, transactions 
that meet the filing thresholds cannot be implemented until they are cleared 
by MOFCOM or until the deadlines for MOFCOM review have lapsed.17  
Again, this mandatory notification system established by the AML 
essentially follows the EU’s pre-merger notification model.18  As of March 
25, 2013, MOFCOM has reviewed 581 concentration transactions; it 
cleared 562 transactions unconditionally, approved 18 transactions with 
restrictive conditions, and prohibited one transaction. 19   However, 
prohibitions and conditional clearances represent less than 3.28 percent of 
all MOFCOM's merger decisions under the AML.  Therefore, despite 
concerns from outside observers, the proportion of prohibitions and 
conditional approvals is largely consistent with other major jurisdictions.20   
Notably, a majority of the transactions on which MOFCOM 
imposed restrictive conditions were offshore transactions between foreign 
parties.21  In several cases, MOFCOM even imposed remedies where the 
EU and US regulators on the same deal either had not imposed remedies or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Id.; AML, supra note 2, arts. 13-31. 
14 See Susan Beth Farmer, The Impact of China's Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on U.S. 
Companies, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 34, 35-36 (2010).!
15 Id. at 35-36. 
16 AML, supra note 2, arts. 20-31. 
17 Id. arts. 26-31.!
18 Joel Mitnick, et al., The Dragon Rises: China's Merger Control Regime One Year on, 23 ANTITRUST 
53, 53 (2009). 
19 The numbers are calculated by the author based on several press releases issued by the MOFCOM.  
See Press Release, MOFCOM, Statistical Information of Concentration Transactions Cleared 
Unconditionally (Nov. 11, 2012), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/201211/20121108437868.html; Press Release, MOFCOM, A 
List of Concentration Transactions Cleared Unconditionally in the Fourth Quarter of 2012 (Jan. 6, 
2013), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201301/20130108512781.shtml; Press 
Release, MOFCOM, A List of Concentration Transactions Cleared Unconditionally in the First Quarter 
of 2013 (April. 2, 2013), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201304/20130400075697.shtml; Press Release, MOFCOM, 
Publication of Decisions of Conditional Clearance Cases (April. 23, 2013), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/. 
20 Wang, supra note 4, at 1. 
21 See U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service, Doing Business in China-2012:  Country Commercial 
Guide for U.S. Companies, EXPORT, 86, 
http://export.gov/china/build/groups/public/@eg_cn/documents/webcontent/eg_cn_025684.pdf (last 
visited May 23, 2013).  
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had imposed different remedies.22  Examples of such transactions include 
the hard disk drive mergers of Samsung and Seagate, Western Digital and 
Hitachi, as well as the Google and Motorola acquisition.23  
The review process in specific cases continues to be relatively 
opaque.  For example, the AML requires only negative decisions to be 
published,24 and some of the decisions published by the MOFCOM are too 
brief to provide a transparent and convincing analysis about how 
MOFCOM reached its conclusions.25  Although the AML also includes a 
controversial provision providing that if a transaction raises national 
security concerns, an independent national security review shall be 
imposed,26 MOFCOM has never explicitly addressed this as grounds for its 
published decisions. 27   On February 12, 2011, China’s State Council 
released new rules setting up a national security review system.28  The 
system aims to screen mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by 
foreign investors that impact Chinese national security.29  On the one hand, 
the new rules raise concerns among foreign investors worried that Chinese 
authorities may use the new rules as a weapon to advance its protectionism 
on the area of mergers and acquisitions.30  On the other hand, the new rules 
help to clarify what transactions may trigger national security review, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The M & A Lawyer Interview:  A Talk on Bric Merger Regimes, 16 M & A LAW, no. 6, 2012, at 11.  
See also Antitrust Alert: China Conditionally Approves Seagate Acquisition of Samsung Hard Drive 
Business, Jones Day (Jan. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-conditionally-
approves-seagate-acquisition-of-samsung-hard-drive-business-01-03-2012/ (last visited May. 19, 2013); 
Ninette Dodoo & Angie Ng, Assessment of Information Technology Mergers in China, COMPETITION 
POLICY INT’L, INC. (2012), http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/Asia-
Column-China-Merger.pdf (last visited May 20, 2013). 
23 MOFCOM imposed conditions on the Samsung/Seagate and the Google/Motorola transactions while 
the EU and US cleared the transactions unconditionally.  In the Western Digital/Hitachi merger, the EU 
and US imposed less stringent remedies than that of China.  For detailed instruction, see infra Part VB. 
24 AML, supra note 2, art. 30. 
25 Farmer, supra note 14, at 49-50.  See also Yee Wah Chin, The Chinese MOFCOM Enforces Telecoms 
Regulations in AML Merger Review (Wal-Mart/Yihaodian) (Jan. 16, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2260474. 
26 AML, supra note 2, art. 31. 
27 Since the AML came into effect, the MOFCOM had published 19 decisions as of March 25, 2013.  
None of them explicitly mentioned “social security.”  The decisions are available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/ (last visited May 22, 2013). 
28 Guanyu Jianli Waiguo Touzhizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye Anquan Shencha Zhidu de Tongzhi (
) [Notice of the State Council’s General Office on 
Establishing the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors](promulgated by State Council’s General Office), Feb. 03, 2011, effective Mar. 04, 
2011) available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-02/12/content_1802467.htm [hereinafter Security 
Review Notice]. 
29 Id. 
30 See Frank Schoneveld & Brian Fu, China’s New Merger Control Regime Makes Major Progress in 
Its First Three Years, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8d61b530-8bdc-4064-a19d-f9510e08b4d3 (last visited 
May 23, 2013). 
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offer MOFCOM an opportunity to enforce merger control solely on 
antitrust grounds with regard to the vast majority of mergers and 
acquisitions by foreign investors that are unlikely to trigger the security 
review.31 
 
II. Transactions Subject to MOFCOM Review 
 
China's merger review scheme is a mandatory pre-closing 
notification and approval process.32  Where parties implement a transaction 
without approval, MOFCOM is entitled to order the parties to unwind the 
transaction, and the parties may also be fined of up to RMB 500,000 
(approximately U.S. $80,000).33  Transactions that meet the statutory filing 
thresholds under the AML must be notified to MOFCOM and cannot be 
implemented until MOFCOM approves the transactions or until the 
deadlines for MOFCOM review are expired.34  According to the AML, a 
transaction must be notified to MOFCOM if (1) the transaction constitutes 
a “concentration," and (2) certain turnover thresholds are met.35  This 
section will first explore what constitutes a “concentration” under the AML, 
followed by an introduction to the turnover thresholds required to trigger 
the AML’s merger review. 
 
A. Concentration-Reportable Transactions 
 
1. “Concentrations” Under the AML 
 
Under the AML, only transactions that qualify as a "concentration" 
require notification to MOFCOM.  For the purposes of the AML, 
concentrations include the following:  “(1) merger of undertakings; (2) an 
undertaking’s gain of control over other undertakings through acquiring 
their shares or assets; and (3) an undertaking’s gain of control over or the 
ability to exert decisive influence on other undertakings by contracts or 
other means.”36 
Neither the AML nor its relevant implementation rules clearly 
specify what constitutes “control” or “decisive influence” for the purposes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 See Security Review Notice, supra note 28. 
32 AML, supra note 2, art. 21. 
33 Id. art. 48. 
34 Id.  
35 AML, supra note 2, arts. 20-21. 
36 Id. art. 20.  According to Article 12 of the AML, an undertaking refers to a natural person, legal 
person, or any other organization that engages in manufacturing or operating commodities or providing 
services.  
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of defining a concentration.37  Therefore, the assessment of control or 
decisive influence requires a case-by-case analysis.  According to 
MOFCOM’s published decisions, MOFCOM holds that the acquisition of 
minority interests and at least certain types of joint venture transactions 
constitute concentrations. 38   In practice, to decide whether a merger 
transaction constitutes a concentration that must be notified to MOFCOM 
under the AML, parties to the transaction may have to engage informal pre-
filing consultation with MOFCOM to ascertain it.39  
 
2. The Role of Minority Interests in Concentrations 
 
The lack of a clear definition of “control” leads to uncertainties as 
to what extent the acquisition of minority interests constitutes a 
concentration.  In addition, the AML does not contain a safe harbor 
provision that ensures acquisitions of minority interests below a certain 
level (holding 20 percent of all shares or less, for example) will not trigger 
a notification requirement.  MOFCOM’s conditional clearance decision on 
the Alpha V/Savio acquisition shows that acquiring a minority interest as 
low as 27.9 percent could be held as gaining “control.”40  According to the 
MOFCOM decision, Savio, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, had more 
than half of the global market share for electronic yarn clearers used for 
automatic winding machines.41  MOFCOM determined that the rest of that 
market was held by Uster Technologies AG (“Uster”), of which Alpha V 
was the largest shareholder, holding a 27.9 percent minority interest.42  
MOFCOM stated that the issue in the transaction was whether 
Alpha V would be able to use its minority holdings in Uster to coordinate 
the operations of Savio and Uster “to eliminate or restrict” competition.43  
MOFCOM decided that it was possible for Alpha V to do so and 
determined that the proposed transaction may have the effect of eliminating 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37See Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Banfa ( )) [Measures on the Notification of 
Concentrations between Undertakings], (promulgated by MOFCOM, Nov. 21, 2009, effective Jan. 1 
2010), art. 3, available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/200901/20090106011461.html 
[hereinafter MOFCOM Notification Rules]. Article 3 of the Notification Rules was supposed to clarify 
the concepts of “control” and “decisive influence.”  However, it merely reiterates Article 20 of the 
AML without providing more guidance.  
38 See Norton Rouse, Antimonopoly Law in China (Mar. 2012), www.nortonrose.com/files/download-
antimonopoly-law-in-china-63824.pdf (last visited May 23, 2012). 
39 HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:34.!
40 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2011] No. 73, Oct. 31, 2011, available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201111/20111107855585.html [hereinafter Alpha V/Savio].  
For comments on the decision, see Jim O'Connell, The Year of the Metal Rabbit: Antitrust Enforcement 
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or restricting competition.44  Therefore MOFCOM required Alpha V to 
divest its Uster holdings as a condition for clearing the transaction.45  
It is worth emphasizing that according to a literal analysis of the 
MOFCOM’s decision, MOFCOM concluded that Alpha V was able to 
control Uster, not because it positively found evidence for such control, but 
simply because MOFCOM could not rule out such possibility. 46 
MOFCOM’s approach in the Alpha V/Savio decision indicated that 
MOFCOM has extensive discretion in deciding whether an acquisition of 
minority interests constitutes an “acquisition of control” and consequently 
triggers notification duty under the AML. 47   Accordingly, parties to 
acquisition of minority interest should be aware that their transaction may 
constitute a concentration requiring notification to MOFCOM, especially 
where the minority interest is significant enough to enable the acquirer to 
potentially control the acquired business or entity.48 
 
3. Joint Ventures as Concentrations 
 
Neither the AML nor its relevant implementation rules expressly 
provide whether the creation of a joint venture by two or more 
undertakings constitutes a type of concentration.  However, it is clear that 
in practice MOFCOM takes the view that the creation of a new joint 
venture is subject to merger control under the AML.49  For example, 
MOFCOM conditionally approved the GE/Shenhua joint venture 
transaction in 2011,50 and the Henkel/Tiande joint venture transaction in 
2012.51  In these two published decisions, MOFCOM explicitly stated that 






46 See Michael Han & Margaret Wang, Key Trends in PRC Merger Control over the Last Year (Aug. 08, 
2012), www.freshfields.com/knowledgedetail.aspx?id=2147933806 (last visited May 23, 2013). 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 See O'Connell, supra note 41, at 69. 
50 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2011] No. 74, Nov. 10, 2011, available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201111/20111107855595.html [hereinafter GE/Shenhua].  The 
GE/Shenhua case is first published case involving establishment of a joint venture in China.  It is also 
the only conditional clearance case involving a Chinese state owned enterprise.  For more detailed 
information of this case, see O'Connell, supra note 41, at 71-72.  
51 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2012] No. 6, Feb. 10, 2011, available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201202/20120207960466.html [hereinafter Henkel/Tiande].!
52 Had it not held that the creation of the two joint ventures involved in the two cases constituted 
concentrations, MOFCOM would not have reviewed the two transactions, not to mention imposed 
conditions on their approval. 
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4. Exemption from MOFCOM Review 
 
A notification to MOFCOM is not required under two 
circumstances:  (1) when an undertaking involved in the concentration 
already holds fifty percent or more of the voting shares or assets of each of 
the other undertakings involved in the concentration; or (2) when an 
undertaking not involved in the concentration holds fifty percent or more of 
the voting shares or assets of each of the undertakings involved in the 
concentration.53  Therefore, certain internal group consolidations among 
affiliates without change of ultimate control are expressly exempted from 
the pre-transaction notification requirement under the AML.  
 
B. Turnover Thresholds 
 
The AML directs the China State Council to set the MOFCOM 
notification thresholds. 54   According to Regulations on Notification 
Thresholds adopted by the China State Council in 2008,55  whether a 
concentration shall be notified to MOFCOM is based on an objective 
standard of worldwide turnover and China-wide turnover, not on the nexus 
of the transaction to China.56  According to the MOFCOM's Notification 
Rules, turnover includes revenues derived from the sales of products or the 
provision of services after deducting relevant taxes and fees. 57   The 
turnover thresholds under the AML are designed to establish jurisdiction 
and not to assess the relative market position of the parties involved in the 
concentration or the impact of the transaction on the relative market.58  
Whether the transaction will be consummated within or outside China is 
irrelevant to the reporting thresholds.59  Thus, transactions that may appear 
to have little or no impact on China may still subject to the reporting 
requirements if the parties to the transactions have substantial turnover in 
China.60  Pursuant to the Regulation on Notification Thresholds, prior 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 AML, supra note 2, art. 22. 
54 Id. art. 21. 
""!Guowuyuan Guanyu Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Biaozhun de Guiding (
) [Regulations of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of 
Concentrations of Undertakings], (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 3, 2008, effective Aug. 3, 
2008), art. 3, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-08/04/content_1063769.htm; translation at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200903/20090306071501.html [hereinafter Regulations on 
Notification Thresholds].!
56 Farmer, supra note 14, at 36; see also Christopher Hamp-Lyons, The Dragon in the Room: China's 
Anti-Monopoly Law and International Merger Review, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1607 (2009) (analyzing 
concerns about China’s notification thresholds without requiring a “nexus of transaction to China”). 
57 MOFCOM Notification Rules, supra note 38, art. 4. 
58 Harris et al., supra note 10, § 12:37. 
59  Id. 
60 Id. 
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notification to MOFCOM is required for concentrations meeting either of 
the following thresholds:  
 
(1) the combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings 
concerned in the preceding financial  year is more than 
RMB 10 billion yuan [approximately U.S. $1.5 billion], 
and the nationwide turnover within China of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned in the preceding 
financial year is more than RMB 400 million yuan 
[approximately U.S. $60 million]; or 
(2) the combined nationwide turnover within China of all 
undertakings concerned  in the preceding financial year is 
more than RMB 2 billion yuan [approximately U.S. $300 
million], and the nationwide turnover within China of each 
of at least two undertakings concerned in the preceding 
financial year is more than RMB 400 million yuan 
[approximately U.S. $60 million].61  
 
1. Calculation of Turnover 
 
MOFCOM's Notification Rules provide further, though limited, 
guidance on calculating turnover.  Initially MOFCOM took the position 
that turnover shall be calculated using the combined turnover of all related 
undertakings under common control with, or of, the parties involved in the 
transaction.62  The combined turnover is calculated across all types of 
products sold by all undertakings within the group, not merely those 
involved in the proposed transaction.63   
The MOFCOM Notification Rules, however, narrowed the scope 
of the seller's turnover for the purpose of pre-merger review.64   The 
method for calculating turnover of the merging parties or the acquirer in an 
acquisition remains the same:  for them, the sales revenues must include the 
turnover of the entire corporate group.65  In contrast, for the seller in an 
acquisition of part of a business, only the sales of businesses affected by 
the proposed transaction (i.e., the target) shall be included.66  The parties to 
the concentration should include any special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Regulations on Notification Thresholds, supra note 55, art. 3. 
#$!HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:37. !
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:37. 
66 MOFCOM Notification Rules, supra note 38, arts. 4, 7. 
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well as the ultimate shareholders of such SPV.67  MOFCOM has also 
established special rules for calculating the relevant turnovers of financial 
companies.68  
 
2. MOFCOM’s Discretionary Power 
 
Even if a concentration does not satisfy the above-mentioned 
turnover thresholds, MOFCOM has the discretionary power to investigate 
the concentration if it believes the concentration may result in the 
elimination or restriction of competition in the Chinese domestic market.69  
However, it is not clear what standard of evidence must be met for 
MOFCOM to conclude that a concentration is likely to restrict or eliminate 
competition and therefore launch an investigation.  Concerns of outside 
investors are naturally raised about MOFCOM’s potential ability to abuse 
this discretionary power.70  It is worth noting that so far MOFCOM has not 
used these discretionary powers.71 
 
III. The Notification Process 
 
MOFCOM’s Notification Rules require specific procedures for 
notification and review of transactions triggering reporting thresholds.  
This section discusses some of those requirements, including:  who has the 
duty to file; when shall the transaction be filed; what materials must be 
submitted; and MOFCOM’s timetable for review. 
 
A. The Filing Party 
 
Although the AML is silent on which party or parties have the 
obligation to file a notification with MOFCOM, the MOFCOM 
Notification Rules state that the parties to a merger shall be responsible for 
filing.72  For other types of concentrations, the undertaking gaining control 
or decisive influence (the notifying party) shall be responsible for filing.73  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 See Shang Ming’s Speech on China Renmin University’s International Anti-Monopoly Forum, 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW (May 7, 2011), http://www.antimonopolylaw.org/article/default.asp?id=3227. 
68 Jinrongye Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Yingyee Jisuan Banfa (
) [The Rules on Turnover Calculation for Concentration of Financial Undertakings] (promulgated 
by the MOFCOM, PBC, CBRC, CSRC and CIRC, Jul. 15, 2009, effective Aug. 15, 2009), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200907/20090706411691.html.!
69 Regulations on Notification Thresholds, supra note 55, art. 4. 
70 HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:36. 
71 Id. 
72 MOFCOM Notification Rules, supra note 38, art. 9. 
73 Id. 
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B. The Timing of Filing 
 
There is no fixed deadline for submitting the notification.  The 
AML provides that a proposed transaction should not be closed before 
MOFCOM grants its approval.74  Therefore, parties are encouraged to file 
as early as practicable.75  MOFCOM typically requires executed copies of 
the transaction documents before it will accept a notification.76 
 
C. Required Notification Materials 
 
The AML provides a general list of information and documents 
requested for the filing, including:  (1) a notification/ letter; (2) an 
explanation of the of the effects that the concentration may have on the 
competition in relevant markets; (3) the merger or acquisition agreement or 
other transaction documents; (4) audited financial statements for all 
undertakings involved in the concentration for the previous accounting year; 
and (5) other information required by MOFCOM.77 Article 10 of the 
MOFCOM Notification Rules provides more detail on information 
requirements, including:  (1) Basic information about the parties and 
detailed ownership structure of the parties and its ultimate parent entities; 
(2) Information on relevant markets and competition. The parties must 
submit an explanation of the effects that the proposed transaction may have 
on the competition in any relevant markets; (3) Information on the 
transaction, including the transaction agreements and relevant documents; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 AML, supra note 2, art. 25.!
75 Emma Davies & Ninette Dodoo, A Practical Guide to Chinese Merger Control, CLIFFORD CHANCE 




77 AML, supra note 2, art 23.!!The MOFCOM Notification Rules and MOFCOM Guidance Opinions on 
the Documents and Information Required for Filing (MOFCOM Filing Guidelines, promulgated by 
MOFCOM on Jan. 5, 2009) provide more detailed specifications on filing requirements.  In addition, 
MOFCOM amended and re-issued its Standard Notification Form on June 6, 2012.  The Form and the 
MOFCOM Filing Guidelines provide more detailed guidance on the information and documents 
required for filing. The MOFCOM Filing Guidelines (in Chinese) are available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/200901/20090105993841.html (last visited May 23, 2013).  For 
details of the Form and the MOFCOM Filing Guidelines, see Press Release, MOFCOM, Statement on 
the Amended and Re-issued Standard Notification Form (Jun. 6, 2012), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/201206/20120608166903.html.  A blank Standard Notification 
Form and a Guideline on Filling out the Form in Chinese are available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/201206/20120608166903.html. 
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(4) Audited financial statements of the parties for the latest fiscal year; and 
(5) Any other information requested by the reviewing authorities.78 
As indicated above, the AML merger control process requires the 
notifying parties to submit a very substantial amount of materials.  In 
practice, MOFCOM applies a uniform materials requirement to all types of 
concentrations that require notification, regardless of their potential impact 
on competition.79  In contrast, the U.S. process has far more simplified 
document requirements in its initial review.  The U.S. antitrust authority 
will require detailed information only if the initial review raises 
competition concerns.80  While the EU’s information requirements are 
more similar to that of China than that of the U.S.,81 the EU has a less 
burdensome and more simplified procedure for non-problematic 
transactions.82  Therefore, the document and information requirements of 
the China merger control regime may more burdensome than those of the 
EU and U.S., especially where transactions involved have no or very 
limited concentration problems. 83   To lower the risk of a rejection, 
notifying parties sometimes have to submit substantial amounts of 
information from the outset, even where such information may not be 
entirely necessary for MOFCOM to examine the transaction adequately 
from the antitrust perspective.84  
 
D. Timetable for Review 
 
1. The Pre-Consultation Phase 
 
In practice, the MOFCOM merger review process generally 
consists of two stages:  the pre-consultation phase and the formal review 
phase.  In most cases, a first attempt to submit a merger filing to 
MOFCOM will not start the 30-day initial waiting period.  Instead, 
MOFCOM typically will review and identify deficiencies in the filing, 
request additional information or documentation, and discuss key 
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78 Peter J Wang & Yizhe Zhang, China: Merger Control, JONES DAY (2010), 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/98dbe559-9834-4fa9-9fe8-
ae531ef7863f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b99baff2-b0d1-470a-9b30-
b768a120e74e/China%20Merger%20Control.pdf (last visited May 25, 2013). 
79 Mitnick, supra note 18, at 55. 
80 See Mats A Bergman, et al., Merger Control in the European Union and the United States: Just the 
Facts (March 4, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565026. 
81 Adrian Emch, Chinese Merger Control - Where Do We Stand?, 11 THE THRESHOLD, no. 2, at 47 
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substantive issues with parties.85  The formal review phases do not start 
until MOFCOM has accepted the notification as complete.86  Additionally, 
MOFCOM does not yet have a short-form application or expedited review 
process.87 
 The standard for “completeness” of a notification is highly 
subjective and determined solely at MOFCOM’s discretion.88  The pre-
consultation process “may take weeks or even months, depending on the 
availability of MOFCOM anti-monopoly staff, the complexity of the issues 
involved, and other factors.”89  For example, the pre-consultation process 
took a month and a half in the InBev/Anheuser-Busch decision;90 fifty-two 
days in the Google/Motorola decision;91 and two months in the Coca-
Cola/Huiyuan decision.92  However, because these transactions resulted in 
negative MOFCOM decisions, they may represent longer pre-consultation 
periods than those of normal cases.93  The unpredictability of the pre-
consultation process will continue to be a concern for international 
transactional antitrust lawyers and their clients.94  
 
2. The Formal Review Phases 
 
When MOFCOM determines that the filing is “complete,” the 
formal review phase begins.  According to the AML, the timetable for 
MOFCOM’s review proceeds as described below. 
 
a.  Phase One of MOFCOM Review 
 
MOFCOM’s initial review period, Phase One, lasts up to 30 days95 
after a filing is accepted as complete. If MOFCOM does not issue a 
decision within the 30-day time limit, the transaction is considered 
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85 HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:43. 
86 Wang, supra note 4, at 1. 
87 Id. 
88 HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:43. 
89 Id. 
90 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2008] No. 95 (“InBev/Anheuser Busch Decision”) (Nov. 18, 
2008), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.html [hereinafter 
InBev/Anheuser Busch]. 
91 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2012] No. 25 (“Google/Motorola Decision”) (May. 19, 2012), 
available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201205/20120508134324.html [hereinafter 
Google/Motorola]. 
92 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2009] No. 22 (“Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Decision”) (Mar. 18, 
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approved and the parties may close their transaction.96  MOFCOM uses this 
time to solicit opinions from other government agencies, trade associations, 
customers, suppliers, and competitors.97 
 
b. Phase Two and Phase Three of MOFCOM Review 
 
If MOFCOM has concerns about the transaction, it can initiate a 
second stage review, Phase Two, for up to an additional 90 days.98  Under 
exceptional circumstances, such as when the parties agree, when 
MOFCOM determines that the information provided by the parties was 
inaccurate, or when circumstances have significantly changed, a third stage, 
Phase Three, extends review for another 60 days.99  For example, in the 
Google/Motorola case, MOFCOM exhausted all 180 days of the three 
phases.100 
During the review process, MOFCOM may investigate a proposed 
transaction by requesting information and documentation from the parties; 
contacting customers, suppliers, competitors, and other relevant entities or 
government agencies; and conducting hearings.101 MOFCOM Notification 
Rules provide additional details regarding MOFCOM’s investigative 
powers in the merger control process and hearing procedures.102  Notably, 
MOFCOM does not need to justify initiating Phase Two or Phase Three 
reviews.103  Although, as stated above, MOFCOM’s merger control system 
resembles the EU regime, there is an important difference regarding Phase 
Two.  The European Commission is entitled to initiate second-phase 
proceedings only when it has serious doubts about a transaction’s effects on 
competition.104  In contrast, the AML entitles MOFCOM to initiate a 
further review without any additional qualification or conditions 
attached.105  In practice, entering Phase Two does not necessarily implicate 
competition concerns.106  For example, some cases entered Phase Two 
simply because MOFCOM could not complete the review in the 30-day 
limit of Phase One, partly because MOFCOM is severely understaffed.107  
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 If MOFCOM decides to reject a transaction or approve it subject to 
conditions, then it must publish a written decision explaining its 
reasoning.108  However, if it approves a transaction unconditionally, then no 
public written decision is required; nonetheless, in most circumstances, 
MOFCOM will privately issue a written notice of approval to the parties.109 
 
IV. Substantive Assessment for Reviewing Concentrations 
 
The substantive test in merger control under AML is whether a 
notified transaction has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition in China.110  AML requires MOFCOM to prohibit such a 
concentration, unless the parties involved can prove that “the positive effect 
of the concentration on competition exceeds the negative effect,” or that the 
concentration is in the “public interest.”111  
 
A. Factors in Substantive Assessment 
 
Article 27 of the AML lists the factors that must be considered in 
the review of concentrations, which include:  (1) the market share of the 
undertakings involved in the relevant market and their ability to control 
market; (2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market; (3) 
the effect of the concentration on market entry and progress of technology; 
(4) the effect of the concentration on consumers and other undertakings; (5) 
the effect of the concentration on China’s economic development; and (6) 
other factors affecting market competition as determined by MOFCOM.112 
Unlike the "significant impediment to competition" test applied in 
EU or "substantial lessening of competition" test applied in U.S.,113 the 
AML does not expressly provide to what extent a transaction’s negative 
impact on competition entails MOFCOM’s prohibition or conditional 
approval decision114  Article 28 of the AML only generally provides that if 
a concentration results in or may result in the elimination or restriction of 
market competition, MOFCOM shall prohibit the concentration.115  If such 
concentration results in a more positive than negative effect on competition, 
or if it is in the “public interest,” MOFCOM will perform a balancing test 
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and may decide not to block the concentration.116  In practice, MOFCOM 
will block or conditionally clear a transaction if the transaction raises 
significant competition concerns. On August 29, 2011, MOFCOM issued 
assessment guidelines for the impact of a concentration on competition, 
which provide certain specific guidance for MOFCOM to assess 
competition effects.117  
The decisions published by MOFCOM provide some insight into 
how MOFCOM actually applies the substantive assessment factors and 
conducts its substantive assessment. While earlier decisions show 
MOFCOM’s analysis and reasoning as relatively cursory, recent decisions 
show more sophistication and transparency.118  It is not yet clear what role 
economic evidence plays in MOFCOM's review.119 
 
B. Non-Competition Concerns 
 
1. Non-Competition Factors Incorporated into AML 
 
The AML expressly refers to the consideration of non-competition 
factors, which differs from the traditional model of antitrust analysis that 
relies solely on competition factors.120  Under the AML, MOFCOM is 
empowered, and technically required, to take into account non-competition 
factors in its merger review process.121  The AML explicitly states that the 
legislative purposes of the statute include advancing the “healthy 
development of [a] socialist market economy” and promoting “public 
interests.” 122   The AML further empowers the State to “make and 
implement” regulations “suitable for the socialist market economy; to 
perfect the macro control; and improve a united, open, competitive, and 
well-ordered market system.”123  The AML also requires that a separate 
review be conducted if the acquisition of a domestic company by a foreign 
investor raises national security issues.124  There are concerns that such 
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non-competition factors may in fact inhibit competition and be abused by 
MOFCOM to protect domestic competitors.125  
 
2. MOFCOM Case Examples 
 
Several of MOFCOM’s conditional clearance decisions and its sole 
prohibition decision raised concerns of protectionism from outside 
China.126  The prohibition decision of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan raised broad 
criticism that MOFCOM used the AML for the purpose of preventing 
foreign enterprises from acquiring the famous domestic brand Huiyuan.127  
In the decision, MOFCOM stated that it prohibited Coca-Cola’s proposed 
U.S. $2.4 billion acquisition of Huiyuan due to competition concerns and 
the failure of the parties to agree on a remedy.128  However, because 
Huiyuan is a well-known domestic Chinese brand, foreign investors 
suspected that the real reason for the prohibition was that MOFCOM did 
not want the famous domestic brand to be acquired by foreign enterprises, 
thereby advancing a protectionist agenda.129  
Such suspicion was raised partly because the decision was too brief 
and lacked a detailed economic analysis regarding the transaction’s impact 
on competition.130  MOFCOM identified three main competition concerns 
as the basis for rejecting the merger.  First, acquiring Huiyuan would 
enable Coca-Cola to leverage its dominance in the carbonated soft drinks 
market into the juice market and consequently limit competition in the juice 
market.131  Second, acquiring the famous brand Huiyuan would strengthen 
Coca-Cola’s already powerful control over the juice market and would 
raise barriers to small or medium sized domestic enterprises’ entry in the 
juice market. 132   Third, the combination of Coca-Cola/Huiyan would 
“squeeze out small and medium sized juice producers in China, and restrain 
local producers from participating in the juice beverage market or their 
ability for proprietary innovation.”133 
As indicated above, in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, MOFCOM did take 
into account domestic competitors, national economic development, and 
negative effects on domestic small and medium-sized juice companies in 
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its decision.  However, MOFCOM also based its decision on the negative 
impact of the proposed transaction on competition.  Although a lack of 
adequate reasoning made its conclusion less convincing, to conclude that 
MOFCOM was using the merger review solely as a vehicle to prevent 
acquisition of famous domestic brand by a foreign company would be 
overstated and hasty.134   
Two of MOFCOM’s later decisions suggest that its Coca-
Cola/Huiyuan decision may “have had more to do with the facts of that 
case than with a larger economic nationalism agenda.” 135   In 2011, 
MOFCOM unconditionally cleared two high-profile acquisitions of famous 
domestic enterprises by foreign enterprises.  One was the acquisition of 
Inner Mongolia-based Little Sheep Group Ltd., the owner of popular hot-
pot chain restaurants in China, by Yum! Brands Inc., the owner of the KFC, 
Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut brands.136  The other was the acquisition by 
Nestlé SA of a 60 percent interest in Hsu Fu Chi International.137  Both Hsu 
Fu Chi and Little Sheep are well-known Chinese brands.  Therefore, it 
would appear that foreign takeovers of popular Chinese brands alone do not 
raise stricter scrutiny from MOFCOM.138  Indeed Shang Ming, the Director 
General of MOFCOM's Anti-Monopoly Bureau, claimed the government 
applies the same uniform criteria and denied the suggestion that MOFCOM 
enforced the AML to discriminate against foreign companies.139  
In cases after Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, MOFCOM has made no 
prohibition decision and has been noticeably cautious about imposing 
remedies on non-competition grounds.140  Despite that, because of a lack of 
transparency and MOFCOM’s relative dependency on China’s central 
government, other higher rank administrative departments, and the China’s 
Communist Party MOFCOM’s conditional clearance decisions often raise 
suspicions of the involvement of non-competition factors.141  For example, 
decisions such as Uralkali/Silvinit, where the merged entity would have 
accounted for at least half China’s imported volume of potassium chloride, 
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an important fertilizer and essential for the Chinese agriculture, were at 
least partly based on industrial policy concerns rather than competition 
concerns.142  Additionally, in the GM/Delphi decision, lobbyists from one 
or more Chinese automobile manufacturers and domestic trade associations 
reportedly influenced the conditions imposed on the transaction.143  On the 
other hand, from a statistical perspective, MOFCOM’s negative decisions 
represent less than 3.3 percent of all its decisions under the merger control 
regime under AML. 144   Therefore, it is probably safe to say that 





China’s merger control regime provides for remedies in the form of 
conditions upon transactions that may restrict or eliminate competition.  
This section introduces the statutory framework of remedies under the 
AML.  It then explores MOFCOM’s practice of imposing remedies.  
 
A. Statutory Framework 
 
According to the AML, if a proposed transaction will have the 
effect of eliminating or restricting competition, MOFCOM may either 
block such transaction, or approve such transaction subject to restrictive 
conditions. 145   Blocking decisions and conditional approvals must be 
published.146   The parties are not allowed to close the transaction if 
MOFCOM decides to block the deal.  Pursuant to the Rules on the Review 
of Concentrations between Undertakings (MOFCOM Review Rules), both 
the parties and MOFCOM may propose restrictive conditions to eliminate 
any anticipated anti-competitive effects from a proposed concentration for 
the purpose of clearing a concentration.147  
Three types of restrictive conditions may be considered:  (1) 
structural remedies (e.g., divesture of assets or businesses); (2) behavioral 
remedies (e.g., an agreement to license key technologies or to terminate 
prior exclusive deal); and (3) combinations of structural and behavioral 
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remedies.148  The Provisional Rules on Divesture adopted and published by 
MOFCOM in July 2010 provide specific rules for structural remedies.149  
The rules mainly cover divestiture procedure, including:  (1) the 
appointment of trustees to oversee the voluntary divestiture process carried 
out by the party subject to MOFCOM’s decision to divest assets or 
business; (2) the procedures for entrusted divesture if the party fails to 
divest specified asset or business voluntarily; and (3) the party’s report duty 
to MOFCOM regarding compliance with the MOFCOM’s decision.150 
 
B. Remedies Imposed in MOFCOM’s Decisions 
 
In practice, MOFCOM has wide discretion in determining the 
appropriate remedies in a particular case.151  For example, in Pfizer/Wyeth, 
Panasonic/Sanyo, and Alpha V/Savio, MOFCOM imposed structural 
remedies that required the divesture of certain assets as a condition to 
approve the transaction. 152   In GM/Delphi and Google/Motorola, 
MOFCOM imposed behavioral remedies, including conditions requiring 
the merged entity not to discriminate against upstream or downstream 
domestic customers and to maintain existing service levels.153  Similarly, in 
GE/Shenhua and Henkel/Tiande, MOFCOM imposed behavioral remedies 
designed to maintain the pre-merger market structure and to guarantee 
existing levels of supply prior to the transaction. 154   In the case of 
Henkel/Tiande, MOFCOM imposed fair and reasonable and non-
discriminatory (“FRAND”) commitments. 155   In Seagate/Samsung and 
Western Digital/HGST, MOFCOM allowed the parties to merger but 
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required freezing the integration for a period determined by MOFCOM.156  
As shown by the above decisions, unlike most antitrust authorities in other 
countries, MOFCOM has shown apparent willingness to impose behavioral 
remedies.157  In fact, to date it has imposed behavioral remedies in ten out 
of seventeen conditional clearance decisions since the AML came into 
force.158 
MOFCOM is confident in taking its own approach in enforcing 
merger control.  When imposing remedies, MOFCOM focuses primarily on 
the impact of the proposed transactions on the Chinese market, even though 
the relevant market may be global.159  Accordingly, imposing remedies, 
MOFCOM sometimes sets conditions specific to the Chinese market.  For 
example, in the GM/Delphi merger, MOFCOM imposed a condition 
requiring a party to continue to supply other customers in the Chinese 
market.160  In the Uralkali/Silvinit merger, MOFCOM required Russian 
potash producers to continue to sell to Chinese customers.161  
At times, MOFCOM imposed remedies when EU and U.S. 
regulators had not imposed remedies, or had imposed different remedies on 
the same deals. 162   For example, in the Seagate/Samsung merger, 
MOFCOM required Seagate to establish an independent subsidiary to 
produce and sell Samsung products, and to prevent information from being 
exchanged between Seagate and the Samsung subsidiary for at least 
another year.163  MOFCOM imposed these requirements despite the fact 
that U.S. and EU authorities had already cleared the Seagate/Samsung 
merger without conditions.164  MOFCOM imposed similar remedies to that 
of the Seagate/Samsung case in the Western Digital/Hitachi merger, 
requiring Western Digital to treat Hitachi as an independent competitor for 
24 months in addition to diverting Hitachi’s 3.5 inch hard disk drive 
business, whereas the transaction was cleared in the EU and U.S. with only 
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159 Koblitz, supra note 142. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.; see also Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2011] No. 33 (“Uralkali/Silvinit Decision”) (Jun. 
02, 2012), available at!http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201106/20110607583288.html. 
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one condition that Western Digital divert Hitachi’s 3.5 inch hard disk drive 
business to a third party.165   
A more recent example is the Google/Motorola merger case.  
Despite the fact that EU and U.S. anti-competition authorities had cleared 
the transaction unconditionally, MOFCOM imposed conditions that, among 
other things, required Google to continue to license the Android free of 
charge and on an open source basis for five years, and treat all downstream 
manufactures in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to the Android 




China has quickly established itself as one of the major merger 
control regimes in the world in a little more than four years since AML 
came into effect on August 2008.  On one hand, MOFCOM’s approach is 
reasonably practical and pragmatic and not a radical departure from that of 
more mature jurisdictions, such as that of the EU and U.S.  On the other 
hand, the new Chinese merger control regime is relatively young and still 
lacks transparency.  It is not clear to what extent the non-competition 
concerns play a role in MOFCOM’s review.  The documentation 
requirements under the MOFCOM’s review system are quite burdensome, 
and the MOFCOM's review process is likely to take relatively longer than 
that of other jurisdictions. It is important for parties to carefully plan their 
Chinese notification anticipating and addressing some of these issues at the 
outset.  
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